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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAY A. LE:MBACH,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

vs.
BARBARA A.

Docket No. 17095

)

cox,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE

This is an action brought by the natural father (plaintiff) of a child
born out of wedlock against the
custody of the child.

child's

natural mother

(defendant)

for

The mother counterclaimed for custody and also sought

an interest in the father's property.

The property claims were settled by the

parties without trial and are not involved in this appeal.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE TRIAL COURT

Upon a trial to the court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, and
after past trial motions, the court entered an Amended Judgment (R. 175)
and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 171) awarding
custody to defendant and granting plaintiff reasonable visitation.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the Amended Judgment and remand of the
case to the District Court with directions to enter judgment in favor of
plaintiff that he be awarded custody of the parties' child, with liberal and
reasonable

visitation for

defendant,

or,

m

the

alternative,

reversal and

remand of the case to the District Court for new trial with directions as to
the proper standards to apply in resolving the issues in dispute.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant are the natural father and mother of Thaddeus
Justin

Lembach,

born

married,

but

they

Avenue,

Salt Lake

August 15,

resided
City,

1978.

The

parties

together in plaintiff's

Utah,

between October,

have never been

residence
1977,

at 781 First

and June, 1979.

After the child's birth and until June 6, 1979, the parties jointly cared for
and raised the child at plaintiff's home.

Each of the parties took an active

and substantial role in providing the child with love, attention, care and
guidance,

although plaintiff provided virtually all of the financial support.

In all material respects, the parties conducted themselves as "a family."

In June, 1979, the parties separated, and defendant took the child with
her to her parents' home in Connecticut and to visit friends in Nova Scotia,
Canada.

In August, 1979, because defendant wanted to travel to Ireland, the

parties agreed that plaintiff would care for the child in Salt Lake City, Utah,
during that month.

On September 4, 1979, fearing defendant's threats to

· deprive him of parental rights by forcibly removing the child from the State
of Utah (Verified Complaint, paragraph 9, R. 3) plaintiff initiated the instant

- 2 -
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51:

action and obtained an order granting him temporary custody and support of
the child (R. 17).

After a hearing on September 14, 1979, the court entered

a stipulated temporary custody and support order (R. 24) granting plaintiff

and defendant "joint" responsibility for the custody and care of the child on
an equal basis pending trial.

In connection with a pre-trial motion by defendant to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint, the court expressly found and concluded that:
plaintiff has adopted the minor child by acknowledgment "for all
purposes" in accordance with 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), and that plaintiff has a right to custody in accordance with
the "best interest of the child" as shall be determined at the time
of trial. (R. 88)
A trial on the merits was held before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on
March 12,

1980.

Dr. Leslie

Cooper,

a licensed clinical psychologist and

professor at the University of Utah, conducted a pre-trial evaluation of both
parties,

prepared

(R. 232-264).

a

written

report

(Ex. P-1),

and

testified

at

trial

In his report, Dr. Cooper made the following observations and

recommendations:
I believe that both Barabara and Jay both sincerely love and
care about Thaddeus, quite apart from their using him and his care
as a means of manipulating the other. I believe that Thaddeus
feels very comfortable with and is attached to both Barbara and
Jay. I could find little evidence from a physchological perspective
to support the claims made by each party as to why the other
should not have custody. I could find no evidence that Jay is so
emotionally disturbed as to be a danger to Thaddeus' psychological
growth. Nor could I find evidence that Jay was irresponsible in
his behavior toward Thaddeus. At the same time, I could find no
evidence that Barbara is suffering from a severe emotional problem.
On the basis of these psychological considerations, it is my
recommendation that Barbara and Jay be given joint custody of
Thaddeus, if the court can find means of terminating the
manipulation of one another. A legal decree may stop the threats
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of "each taking Thaddeus from the other. " Their dependency on
each other in caring for Thaddeus must end, and each must find
his/her own solutions to the problems which arise in caring for
Thaddeus when is is with them. Constructive means must be found
to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions to common child rearing
problems which naturally arise. I believe the present joint custody
procedures could be continued, or the stay might be lengthened to
a week.
There are problems with such a recommendation, namely, that
the conditions required for its success cannot be legislated. Were
the implimentation of this recommendation not feasible, it would then
be my recommenation that Barbara be awarded custody of
Thaddeus, and Jay be awarded liberal visitation rights.
Such
rights would not necessitate the need for supervision. In view of
the plans of Barbara to move to the East if awarded custody, Jay's
visitation rights should be for relatively long blocks of time such as
over a summer and/or for extended vacation periods.
At trial, Dr. Cooper testified that it would be "best" for the child to

maintain a "strong relationship" with both parents (R. 237).

With respect to

the defendant's willingness to facilitate such a relationship between the child
and plaintiff, he testified as follows:

Q
(By Mr. Leta) In your conversations with Mr. Lembach,
did he ever say to you that he had any intention of precluding
Barbara from having a meaningful relationship with Thaddeus?
A

Not as such, that I recall.

Q
Looking at the other side of the picture, m your
conversations with Barbara, did she ever indicate or say anything
to you that suggested that she did not want Jay to have a
meaningful relationship with Thaddeus?
A

Yes , she did.

Q

What kind of things did she say in that regard?

A
She stated that not only did she feel that Mr. Lembach
should not have custody, but he should be given no visitation
rights.
And if visitation rights were given, they ought to be
supervised.

- 4 -
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Nevertheless, Dr. Cooper believed that joint custody would be "best" for the
child.

He made an alternate recommendation, however, that defendant have

custody with long blocks of unsupervised visitation for plaintiff because the
joint custody situation "is problematic" when the parties "live a great distance
apart from one another 11 (R. 247-248).

Dr. Richard Schneiman, a specialist in child psychology and development
and former child psychologist at Primary Children's Medical Center, also
evaluated the parties and testified at trial (R. 165-191).

Dr. Schneiman

stated that both parties were "psychological parents" for the child (R. 268).
However, as between the parties, Dr. Schneiman observed that plaintiff was
more willing to accept defendant, more willing to engage in accomodation
and/or compromise with defendant, more flexible,

had greater trust,

and

exerted greater effort to be fair about sharing the child (R. 269, 272).

As

with Dr. Cooper, Dr. Schneiman testified that the "ideal" situation would be

to order "joint custody" based on an "equal distribution of time" (R. 273),
but that such a situation "becomes very difficult if defendant chooses to leave
the area because of the geographic distances involved" (R. 273).

Dr. Schneiman testified that children who are raised by one parent have
a "greater likelihood of developing emotional problems" (R. 275).

He also

stated that children who are raised by parents who reflect animosity and
hostility toward the opposite parent not only have difficulties relating to the
non-custodial parent but in 80 percent of the cases experience divorce in
their own marriages (R. 276-277).

Such children have a higher incidence of

"acting out" and experiencing "serious emotional disturbances," in his opinion
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(R. 277).

In light of this research, Dr. Schneiman expressed the view that

the "most overriding factor" in selecting a custodial parent would be the
"willingness of the divorced parents to negotiate and accommodate a shared
way of raising the child" (R. 275).

Based on his observations of the parties, Dr. Schneiman 1 s preference
would be to place the child in the physical custody of the parent "who's the
most flexible and accommodating of the parties" (R. 279).

Dr. Schneiman also

expressed the opinion that, as between the parties, the defendant was less
likely to fallow through with whatever the court were to order (R. 282).

Finally,
negotiate

Dr. Schneiman
solutions"

testified

than

did

that

plaintiff had a "greater ability to

defendant (R. 290)

important for the child to maintain a strong

11

and that it would be

father-son relationshipn with

plaintiff (R. 290).

In

addition

to

the

cliff erences

stated

above,

significant economic differences between the parties.

the

evidence showed

Plaintiff owned a home,

had regular income and had employable skills as a carpenter. Defendant, on
the other hand, was unemployed, depended on welfare for her support, had
made "no effort" to find employment, had no permanent residence, had not
earned any significant income in the last three years, and had no definite
plans for the future other than to move back to Connecticut to live with her
parents.

Neither of defendant's parents testified.

Furthermore, defendant

admitted that she was very hostile and agressive toward plaintiff (R. 348)
· and that she did not want him to visit the child without the supervision of
another adult ( R . 348) .

- 6 -
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On the basis of the foreging evidence,

the court entered its initial

findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment (R. 137, 140).
awarded

custody

of

the

child

to

defendant

because

of

The court
a

"maternal

presumption" that young children should be with their mothers unless they
are unfit

(R. 172,

toward the

383), because plaintiff was "insensitive" and "selfish"

defendant in refusing to marry her ( R. 361,

382,

386),

and

because plaintiff refused to "accept his responsibility" to legitimate the child
through marriage (R. 361).

After trial, plaintiff moved to amend the judgment and, on the basis of
a new trial.

The court partially

granted the motion to amend but denied a new trial.

This appeal ensued.

newly

discovered evidence,

moved for

ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT APPLlED ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARDS
IN RESOLVING THE CUSTODY DISPUTE BETWEEN THE

PARTIES.

From the record it is difficult to ascertain with precision what legal
standard the trial court applied in resolving the custody dispute beween the
parties.

It is clear, however, that the court did not apply the same standard

to plaintiff as it did to defendant and, in fact, applied tests which were
contrary to law.
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At the conclusion of the trial, the court said:
. . . I have a difficult time accepting the concept of lack of
flexibility on the part of the defendant, in view of your [plaintiff]
apparent lack of flexibility in terms of accepting paternal
responsibility in a direct sort of way.
The Court, a year later, has legitimized the child, has adopted
the child, and the plaintiff has adopted the child through
acknowledgment of paternity under the statutes of the State of
Utah, but it's clear that the child was, under the law, bastard for
a year-.- Itappears -u) the Court that you 'vebeen selfish, that
you've wanted to exercise your rights and privileges, much to the
exclusion of the defendant, on your terms and on your conditions,
and I think you've been very insensitive to her problems. She has
had some emotional adjustments to make. Maybe fathers do, but we
don't have them in the physical and emotional sense, as women do.
We don't ~ through the physical and psychological changes that
they do.

I

have a hard time understanding the view, in view of those
circumstances, why you didn't legitimize that child by marriage and
accept that respon5ibillty, even if it wouI<fresult in a divorce, so
that at the time of the birth it was a legitimate child. Pm going to
award custody to the defendant. The testimony of the experts is
clear that they see neither one of you as unfit. I think there is no
disagreement with either of them that the Court really shouldn't
interfere with the child having a strong relationship with both. I
think it's obvious to the Court that it is in the best interests of
the child that it have two parents. She's not got the emotional
support from you, and it appears natural that she would want to go
back where her family is . . . (R. 381-382). (emphasis added)
It is apparent from the foregoing that the court preconditioned plaintiff's
right to custody upon some sort of ill-defined sho\ving that he was "sensitive"
to

defendant's "emotional adjustment" and that he had "accepted parental

responsibility in a direct sort of way" by "legitimizing" the child through
marriage "even if it would result m a divorce."

This standard imposes a

greater burden upon the natural father of the child than upon the child's
natural mother and has absolutely nothing to do with what is i..11 the child's
· best interests.
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The court's prejudice against plaintiff was made evident even before the
.ose of the trial.

During plaintiff's direct examination, the following colloquy

risued between the court and the witness:

BY THE COURT:

Q
Do you understand that
is a bastard?
A

the eyes of the law Thaddeus

I don't understand the definition of a bastard.

THE COURT:
marriage?
A

in

An illegitimate child born without the benefit of

Yes.

LETA:
Your Honor, I would like to just make one
mention of the record in this case, which indicates that Judge
Duram [sic] has found the child to have been adopted for all
MR.

purposes.

Q

(By the Court) Well, I recognize the order is in there,
but I understand that the law does provide that if the parents
aren't married, that under the laws of this state, the child would
be a bastard.

A

I understand he's an illegitimate child, yes.

Q
Do you understand that
legitimacy through the act of marriage?
A

he

would

have

obtained

Yes.

Q
Why would you choose not to legitimize him through the
act of marriage?
A

I

understood that he

also gained legitimacy by being

adopted.
Do you feel that you have any real conception or feeling
about what changes a woman is going through during gestation,
emotional changes and feelings that she goes through?
Q

A

During pregnancy?

Q

Yes.
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A

I've attempted to understand those, yes.

Q
Do you think you have got any conception or sensitivity
about how that must be in a state of being not wedded?
A
I would say that I attempted to understand the feelings
and other things that were going on with Barbara. I don rt believe
that that was all that was going on with Barbara. In fact, the
issue of marriage, she was strongly against being marriaed, and
she only became interested in getting married after Thaddeus was
born.

Q
Do you feel that during that particular period a woman
need a little extra support and understanding?
A
I feel that both people need support, but, yes, I do feel
the woman needs support, and I felt that I gave her extremely--a
lot of support.
Do you feel that you provided that?

Q

A
Yes.
(R. 321, 322)

And, during the hearing on plain tiff's post trial motions, the court made the
following remarks:
THE COURT:
. . . You may find, if it's not in there, that
he got the gal pregnant and he refused to marry her and was
insensitive generally to the female problems that she went through
in terms of childbirth, and in fact has parents in the state of
Connecticut, and that he by his conduct or actions discouraged her
from going back where she belonged. (R ~ 382)

***
THE COURT: The only conclusion I reach from that evidence
is that he's less than sensitive about what his individual
responsibilities might be.
And to say that he is the most
responsible and most fit under those circumstances is shocking to
the Court's conscience. (R. 386)
The court obviously measured plaintiff's fitness by its subjective perception
of

his

moral

responsibility

under

the

circumstances_,

although

standard was applied to the defendant or recognized in law.
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no such

~:

The court also based its custody decision on an absolutely erroneous
application of the "maternal presumption."

In its conclusions of law the court

states:
2.
Under case law in the State of Utah and under the
common law of this State there is a Efesumption that ~ child of
tender years should be in the custody of their mother unless the
mother is unfit. In this case, no evidence has been presented that
the mother is unfit to care for the child. Absent such a finding,
custody should be awarded to the mother of the child.
This
conclusion is in addition to and is distinct from Conclusion of Law
number 1 above. (emphasis added)
This standard has no support m the current law of this state as will be
shown below.

Finally,

the court applied a test respecting joint custody which, in

effect, precluded such an award, even if such were in the best interest of
the child.

The court refused to even consider joint custody unless the

parties were able to

"negotiaten

an arrangement on their own.

At the

conclusion of trial the court said:
. . . The child needs some stability and consistency, which the
experts recognized. They both recognize that the solution to joint
custody is an ideal situation which is not in touch with the reality
of this particular case.
I have no reason to believe that she's
going to disobey the Court's order about providing him access to
his child, encouraging a good relationship.
She performed
admirably well under strange and strained circumstances. It's just
unusual and out of the ordinary that a man assume the role you
have taken during the pendency of these kinds of proceedings.
You initated the action, and apparently there was some splitting up
and sharing up to that particular time, and there 1 s evidence that
you do have problems that you can't see eye to eye on, you have
cliff erences that you can't resolve on your own, and the joint
custody relationship contemplates the situation where maybe the
child can live in a close neighborhood with the two of you, the
child can have one set of friends and a school that they rely upon,
where the two parents can get together as adults and do
everything, I suppose, but live together, and be able to handle
their problems as a man and wife. (emphasis added) (R. 362-363)
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The foregoing supports the conclusion that the trial court (a) measured
plaintiff's "fitness" to have custody by his unwillingness to "legitimate" the
child

by marrying

defendant;

the

defendant

and by

his

"insensitivity"

toward the

(b) "presumed" that defendant should have custody unless she

was unfit; and (c) refused to order joint custody unless the parties could
"negotiate"

the

terms

of

the

arrangement out of court.

Each of these

standards is erroneous and prejudiced plaintiff.

Plaintiff is

the natural,

biological father of the child in issue, and

therefore is capable of adopting the child by acknolwedgment in accordance
with § 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
(U. 1980).

Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647

That statute provides:

The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as
his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is
thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate frOiil the time of its
birth.
The foreging provisions of this chapter do not apply to
such an adoption. (emphasis added).
The plaintiff adopted the child pursuant to this statute as Judge Durham
recognized and as the evidence unequivocably demonstrates.
Dennis,

594 P. 2d 898

(Ut.

1979) .

Judge

Rigtrup

See, State v.

erroneously

believed,

however, that the "adoption" was not effective until ~l•..:dge Durham entered
her order on December 24, 1979 (R. 88), and that the child was a bastard
from the time of its birth until that date.

The statute clearly makes the child

legitimate "for all purposes . . . from the time of its birth," contrary to

Judge Rigtrup's belief.
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Since the child was legitimate from birth, the proper test to apply in
determining custody as between the natural parents would be to apply the law
governing

custody of legitimate

Annotated (Supp. 1979).

children which

is

§ 30-3-10,

Utah

Code

"The legislative purpose giving rise to [ § 78-30-12]

is to confer on an illegitimate child the civil and social status of a lawful child
of the natural father."

M., 122 Cal.

Mace v. Webb, supra., at 648.

Rptr. 531;

537 P.2d 363 (1975).

natural mother of illegitimate
Annotated

(1953)]

children

[See,

See, In re Richard

Standards which prefer the
e.g.

§ 77-60-12,

Utah Code

have no place in custody disputes involving legitimate

children.

Section 30-3-10 provides:
In any case of separation of husband and wife having minor
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved, the
court shall make such order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the
parties.
The court may inquire of the children and take into
consideration the children's desires regardng the future custody;
however, such· expressed desires shall not be controlling and the
court may,
nevertheless,
determine
the children rs custody
otherwise.
Although the statute seems to apply only to separations of "husband and
wife" or situations involving "void or dissolved" marriages, it is proper to
apply this standard in the instant case because the relationship between the
parties

is

analogous

Annotated (1953).

to

a

void marriage under § 30-1-3(3),

Code

Even though the parties made no effort to solemize their

relationship, they held themselves out as husband and wife.
erroneously

Utah

prejudiced

plaintiff

by

requiring

him

to

Thus, the court
show

"unfitnessn before he could obtain custody.
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defendant's

The

trial court acknowledged that it was applying a strict maternal

prefernce in the instant case.

The most recent pronouncements of this court

suggest that a maternal preference is proper only if all other things are equal
Otherwise, the sex of the parties plays no part in a

between the parties.
custody

dispute,

consideration.

and

the best interests of the

child must be the only

nwhenever, pursuant to a consideration of such interests, anl

circumstances in the case preponderate in favor of the husband, all things
are

not

equal."

Jorgensen

v.

Jorgensen,

599P.2d510

(Ut.

1979).

Assuming, arguendo, that such a "maternal preference" is constitutional, the
trial court erroneously applied the preference in the instant case.

The

circumstances

the instant case were not equal and clearly

m

preponderated in favor of plaintiff.
plaintiff

was

the

more

flexible

Both psychologists acknowledged that

and accommodating party.

superior financial capability and a more stable,
which to raise the child.

Plaintiff had

permanent environment in

The court unjustif ably ignored these differences

and, in fact, erroneously believed that financial capability had "no bearing on
the issue"

In

(R. 311).

the Jorgensen

case,

supra,

one of the central considerations in

support of the trial court's judgment that the father should be awarded
custody was the fact that

11

plaintiff's present income was minimal" and that

"defendant

[was]

responsible,

particularly

close

relationship

· competent to care for him."

[had]
with

adequate

his

Id. at 512.

son,

employment.
and

[was]

enjoy[ed] a

m all respects

Here, the sexual bias in the lower

court's decision can be seen most vividly by simply reversing the tables and
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asking the rhetorical question
father if he

11

Would the court have awarded custody to this

were unemployed,

had no permanent residence,

had minimal

earning capacity, were openly hostile and agressive toward his wife and had
no definiate plans for the future?"

The answer is obvious.

The court's

decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence and inconsistent with the
standards announced by this court.

Finally, the trial court applied an improper standard for determining
whether to award joint custody between the parties.

While there is no

statutory authority in Utah permitting "joint custody" between divorced or
separated parents (nor even a definition of the term), there is also no legal
prohibition of a joint custody arrangement.

In several cases this court has

acknowledged that "split" or njointn custody is a proper form of relief and
can be in the child's best interest.

The court, however, has never instituted

a test or standard for making such an award.

See Sanders, Division of

Clinical Custody in Utah, pp. 47-51, Utah Bar Journal, Spring 1977.

Joint

custody

responsibility

for

has
the

been

defined

children's

as

care

giving

and

both

alternating

parents

11

legal

companionship."

Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining

Problems:

Modifications,

Primitive

Decrees,

Joint

65 Cal. L. Rev. 978, 1009 (1977).

application of the

term

"joint custody"

results when a joint award is made.

Custody

and

Excessive

There has been no uniform

and no single management which
Joint or divided custody decrees

generally give both parents legal responsibility for the child's care.
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Professional child psychologists are evenly split on the merits of joint
custody,

although

divorce

are

rejection.
No. 2,

there is

subject

Roman,

Del.

1977.

to

almost universal recognition

severe

strain,

loss

The Disposable Parent,

that children of

of security and feelings of

15 Conciliations Courts Review,

The most strenuous arguments in opposition are that

children in joint custody arrangements may suffer a lack of stability in their
home environment or may fall prey to loyalty conflicts in attempting to
maintain positive emotional ties

to

two hostile adults.

Goldstein, et al.,

Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 37-38 (1973).

On

the other hand,

"visitation 11
experience

are

relegated

feelings

of

proponents
to

deep

argue that fathers

seeing
loss

involvement with their children.

their

and
Roth,

often

children

who have only

only

intermittently,

overreact by limiting their

The Tender Years Presumption in

Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. Fam L. 423 ( 1977) ; Annot. 70 A. L. R. 3d 262
(1976).

Further, there is no scientific data for the de facto preference in

favor of mothers.

In todays world of two career families, fathers are equally

nurturant and competent to care for their offspring.
Custody:

See

~.,

Victory for All, N. Y. Times 3-6-77, XXII 18: 1.

Molinoff, Joint

Finally, and most

importantly, a child needs a substantial involvement with both his parents.

In the instant case, both psychologists recommended that joint custody
be imposed by the court and each testified that such an arrangement would
be "ideal" and "best" for the child.

The trial court found that each party

· was "fit" to have custody of the child (R. 172, paragraph 8).

In fact,

custody had been "divided between the parties pursuant to the order of the
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Court 11 for over five months before trial (R. 172, paragraph 7).
also

found

that

"the

best

interests

of

The court

the child would be served by

maintaining a strong relationship with both parents" (R. 172, paragraph 9).
Nevertheless,
by

"opposed"

the

court refused to award joint custody because it was

defendant

and

because

defendant

planned

to

move

to

Connecticut.

Plaintiff concedes that where the parties live a great distance from one
another a joint custody arrangement on an equal-time basis is difficult,
especially for young children.

However, something less than equal time could

have been ordered (Ex. P-1) under the circumstances.

More importantly,

both the court and the psychologists were mislead by defendant's statement
about her future plans.

As will be discussed below, defendant did not intend

to leave the state permanently and in fact has been living in Salt Lake City,
Utah, on a continuous basis since June, 1980.

Of

equally serious

consequence is

the court's

conclusion that joint

custody could not be awarded because it was "opposed" by the defendant.
Such a standadrd would render the court impotent to make an award which is
best for the child simply because one parent opposes it.

"A court must, in a

custody dispute, give the highest priority to the welfare of the children over
the desires of either parent."

Kallas

Vo

Kallas,

614 P.2d 641, 645 (Ut.

1980).

Obviously, whenever a matter is contested it will be "opposed" by one

party.

Thus, if the courtts standard represents the law, no court could ever

award joint custody in a contested case.
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Both psychologists found the parties to have nsimilar parenting skills
and styles. n

This should be the test in making an award between parents

who are equally fit because it insures consistency and stability for the child
and, at the same time, enables the child to develop a strong bond with both
parents.

This court should disavow the trial court's test and announce a

proper standard to apply in resolving joint custody disputes.

See Miller,

Joint Custody, 13 Fam.L.Q. 1979, pp. 369-74.

In summary, the trial court applied erroneous legal standards in this
case.

The court prejudiced plaintiff's right to custody because the child was

born out of wedlock in spite of the child 1s adoption "from birth" pursuant to
§ 78-30-12.

The court applied an absolutely erroneous "maternal preference

test which required plaintiff to show defendant's "unfitness" before he could
obtain custody.

And, the court applied an inappropriate test for

whether joint custody would be in the child's best interest.

II
COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTE AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

THE

Since a child custody proceeding is equitable and is based primarily and
foremost on the welfare and interests of the minor children, this court can
review the evidence and make an independent judgment about the proper
resolution of the case, as well as determine whether the court abused its
· discretion.

In the case at bar, the findings and conclusions are simply not

supported by the evidence.
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In its conclusions, the trial court said:
Considering all the circumstances, the best interest of the
child Thaddeus Justin Lembach would be served by awarding
Defendant sole and exclusive custody, subject to reasonable
visitation by Plaintiff.
1.

The court's own findings,

however,

do not support this conclusion.

For

example, the only findings of the court on the question of which parent
should have custody are the following:
Since October 1977, Plaintiff has maintained a residence in
Salt Lake City, Utah at 781 First Avenue.
5.

Since January 1, 1978, Defendant has not maintained any
permanent employment between 8/15/78 and 6/6/79 and had primary
responsibility for the care of the child of the parties. At the time
of the trial Defendant was receiving public assistance from the State
of Utah.
6.

Since October 2, 1979, custody of the minor child has
been divided between the parties pursuant to the Order of this
Court.
7.

Defendant is a fit and proper person to have custody of
the child of the parties.
Plaintiff is fit to have custody of the
child.
8.

***
11.
family.

Defendant plans to move to Connecticut to be close to her

12. Plaintiff is employed full-time by Omni Structures and
earns approximately $8.00 per hour or $16,000 per year.

Clearly, these findings support the conclusion that plaintiff is more financially
secure and more stable than is defendant.

Since all other findings are either

neutral or equal as between the parties, a preponderance of the evidence, 2x_
the court's own findings, compels the conclusion that the best interests of the
child would be served by awarding custody to plaintiff, not defendant.
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Without repeating what has been said above, the testimony at trial further
demonstrates that the court's decision was arbitary.

It is blatently obvious

from the record that the trial court was biased against plaintiff because of his
decision not to marry defendant, because of an erroneous misunderstanding
about the effect of adoption pursuant to § 78-30-12, and because of a total
misunderstanding of the "best interests n doctrine in this state.

III
APPLICATION OF ANY SEXUAL PREFERENCE IN CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, LACKS
ANY SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO AN IMPORTANT
STATE INTEREST, AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

From

the

foregoing

discussion,

it is

apparent that the trial court

discriminated against plaintiff because of his sex in at least three ways.
First, the court imposed a great burden of proof upon plaintiff that it did
upon defendant.

Second, the court did not weigh the evidence in the same

fashion for both parties, as when it discounted plaintiff's financial ability and
his more stable home environment while placing an unwarranted premium upon
defendant's

nurturing

ability

because

of

her

sex.

Finally,

the

court

discriminated against plaintiff by applying a legal standard which presumed
that defendant should have custody unless plaintiff could prove that she was
"unfit."

Setting aside for the moment the fact that the court did not properly
apply the "maternal preference" as outlined by this court in Jorgensen

~

Jorgensen, supra, any preference for one of the parties because of sex. even
as permitted by Jorgensen, is unconstitutional and warrants reversal.
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The right of a parent to the care, custody and nurture of his child is
such a precious

and fundamental right of all citizens that it cannot be

deprived in a manner inconstistent with the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

As the United States Supreme Court said in Stanley

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972):
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family.
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have
been deemed "essential," . . . "basic civil rights of man," . . .
and "[r]ights far more precious . .
than property rights." . . .
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. " . . .
o

Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.
The Court has declared
unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate,
children a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother,
emphasizing that such children cannot be denied the right of other
children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm,
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally
organized family unit. . . .
"To say that the test of equal
protection should be the 'legal' rather than the biological
relationship is to avoid the issue. 11 For the Equal Protection Clause
necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal' lines
as 1't ch ooses. " . . .
These authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stanley's
interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and
substantial. (citations omitted)

Recently, the court again addressed this issue in Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S.
distinctions

380

(1979)

where

it

held

that

a

state

statute

between the rights of unmarried mothers

which

makes

and the rights of

unmarried fathers cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under the equal
protection clause unless it can be shown to be "substantially related to an
important state interest. n

In that case, the court found no justifiable basis

for making any gender-based distinctions in connection with the right of
natural parents to withhold consent in adoption proceedings.
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A "maternal preference" in resolving custody disputes, whether applied
only as a "tie-breaker" or otherwise, has no place under the equal protection
clause

of

either

(Article I, § 2).
a

preference

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

or

the

Utah

There is no "substantial governmental objective" which such

serves

and

"substantially related to the

it would not be

achievement of those objections" if any could be concocted.
a

preference

Constitution.

purely

is

a

creation of this

court,

Moreoever, such

which is

contrary to

legislative intent since it modifies the otherwise plain meaning of the 1977
amendment to § 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953).
lacks vitality in fact.

The presumption also

Roth, the Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody:

Victory for All, supra; Annot. 76 A.L.R.3d 262.

Without the benefit of facts supporting an nadoption" under statutes like
§78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953), several courts have held that there
are no presumptions in favor of the mother in a custody proceeding involving
an illegitimate child and that the only standard is the "best interest of the

child."

Godinez

Commonwealth

v

v

Russo,

Martin,

394 A.2d 1377 (D.C.

App.

49 Misc. 2d

381 A.2d

173

66·

'

(Pa.

266

N . Y . S . 2d

1977);

636

Bazemore v.

(1966);

Davis,

1978); In re Domingo T., 48 L.W. 2208 (N.Y.

Family Ct. 1979).

In addition,

several courts,

including the Supreme Court of Nevada,

(Arnold v.

Arnold, 604 P. 2d 109 (Nv. 1979)) have abolished the maternal

presumption

in

all child custody disputes. even as a tie-breaker, for the

· reason that the presumption is a judicial crutch for avoiding the often
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difficult

decision of

the

child's

best interest.

See,

also,

McAndrew v.

McAndrew, 46 L. W. 2462 (Md. 1978); Commonwealth v. Carson, 368 A. 2d 635
(Pa.

The

1977).

Nevada

court's

discussion

m

Arnold

is

particuarly

noteworthy because of the striking similarity between the law m Nevada and
in Utah.

Finally,

preference

is

at least one

unconstitutional

state court has

under

the

held that the maternal

equal protection clause.

State

ex rel. Watts v Watts, 350 N. Y. S. 2d 285 (1973).

Preferences
disputes.

and presumptions

should play no

role in

child custody

The children in issue deserve standards which realistically advance

their best interest.

In todays world mothers do not hold a monopoly on the

subject of child rearing and in many situations can be a worse role model
than a working father.

The choice of which parent is "best" for the child

seldom is often difficult, especially where both parents want the child.

But

the choice must not be avoided by the use of easy, inadequate preferences
and assumptions.

For these reasons, this court should reverse the trial court and should
take this opportunity to abolish the maternal preference in all child custody
disputes.
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IV

IT WAS ERROR TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.

After the trial, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence
Connecticut,

showing that

her home

(R. 104).

defendant intended to make Utah, not
Before trial,

plaintiff had sought the

production of all public assistance applications submitted by defendant since
July 1, 1977 (R. 29, no. 7).

The documents were not produced prior to trial

because defendant claimed that they could not be obtained from the public
authorities, and plaintiff could not obtain the documents directly because of
various privacy limitations.

The application which was finally produced (R. 108) was submitted on
November 5,

1979, and contains an affirmative answer, under oath, to the

I

question "Do you intend to make your home in Utah?"

(R. 108, no. 12).

The application also contains material information about defendant's income,
property, residence and financial affairs, all of which were important facts
for the court to consider in connection with the custody issue.

In

support

of

the motion,

plaintiff also

submitted the affidavit of

Dr. Cooper (R. 165) which states that had he known about defendant's prior
sworn statement at the time he conducted his interviews he "would have
questioned her much more thoroughly about her stated intent to return to
Connecticut to live with her parents and this fact also would have played a
role in [his] recommendation."
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The evidence shown by this application was extremely important and
warranted a new trial.

First. it tends to impugn defendant's credibility and

honesty, which not only creates doubt about other aspects of her testimony,
but also raises serious implications about her moral standing and character as
a parent.

It suggests that defendant is willing to lie or stretch the truth for

the purpose of manipulating the rules to her own advantage.

Second, it

directly contradicts her stated intent to leave Utah which was a central
consideration
hampered

the

in

plaintiff's

cross-examination.

joint

custody

ability

Because

of

determination.

to

purge

the

character

Finally,

defendant's
of this

it

seriously

testimony

evidence,

on

and its

importance to the issues in dispute, a new trial was warranted under the
standards

governing

such

motions.

See,

Rule 59,

Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure; 6A Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 59.08(3] (2nd Ed. 1979);
Denial of

the

motion

under

the

circumstances

constituted

an abuse of

discretion.

CONCLUSION

The

fore going discussion

demonstrates

that the

trial court did not

understand the proper legal standards to apply in resolving the issues in
dispute

between the parties.

The court measured plaintiff's fitness

by

subjective standards of morality concerning whether it would have been right
or proper for the plaintiff to "legitimate" the child by marrying the defendant
in spite of the clear language of § 78-30-12 to the contrary.

further

prejudiced plaintiff's ability

defendant to

to obtain

The court

custody by requiring the

somehow cure a perceived "insensitivity" to the defendant.

There is no support in the law in this state for standards and burdens of
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this kind.

Moreover, since these tests were not applied to both parties, the

injury to the plaintiff is more manifest.

The

court

also

failed

to understand the proper application of the

maternal presumption or tender years doctrine.

The court assumed that a

child of tender years should be with its mother unless the mother is "unfit."
In fact, the doctrine only applies in the case of a tie when all things are
equal between the parties.

The application of this standard prejudicially

increased plaintiff's burden of proof.
joint custody question was

The court's standard for resolving the

not only unrealistic and unworkable but also

contrary to the child's best interest.

The trial court not only applied erroneous standards of law in resolving
the dispute but its decision is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and demonstrates an abuse of discretion.

The situation between the

parties was far from equal and, as the court's own findings illustrate, was
weighted

in

favor

of

the

plaintiff.

Both plaintiff and

acknowledged by all to be "fit" parents.

defendant were

There is nothing in the evidence,

and in particular in the court's findings, to illustrate why the plaintiff was
less fit than the defendant or, for that matter, why the defendant was more
fit than the plaintiff.

However, the record is clear, that plaintiff's income

exceeded that of the defendant, that his work and employment history were
more regular and stable than that of the defendant,
•

environment was

more

and that his home

stable and permanent than that of the defendant.

. Moreover, both psychologists testified that plaintiff was more accommodating
and flexible than was the defendant.

These differences, under the
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circumstances,

were

not

insignificant;

interest" in plaintiff's favor.

they

tipped

the

scales

of

"best

Disregarding these differences, renders the

trial court's conclusions wholly arbitrary and capricious.

The trial court also discrllninated between the parties on the basis of
sex.

Such discrllnination has no place in the resolution of a child custody

dispute where the parties have an equal right to the care, custody and
nurture of their child.

Application of any

discrimination,

including the

maternal presumption as currently applied by the courts of this state, is an
unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment and in Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution.

Finally, the court abused its discretion in failing to grant plaintiff a new
trial because the newly discovered evidence was of a material and substantial
nature and would have probably affected the outcome of the trial.

For all of these reasons,

therefore,

this

court should reverse and

remand the case to the district court with directions to enter judgment in
favor of plaintiff that he be awarded custody of the child with liberal and
reasonable visitation for the defendant or, in the alternative, reverse and
remand the case to the district court for a new trial with directions as to the
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proper standards to apply m

resolving the issues in dispute between the

parties.

0.
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